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Abstract
	 The	purpose	of	 this	paper	 is	 to	study	 for	how	corporate	governance	 in	Japanese	
firms	has	developed	more	effective	for	M&A.	Mandatory	disclosure	related	to	corporate	
governance	have	rapidly	 improved	and	established.	However,	 the	sensational	case	of	
Olympus	 for	accounting	 fraud	makes	us	 to	 remember	 that	 Japanese	 firms	have	 the	
weakness	of	corporate	governance	and	audit	as	well	as	various	disgraceful	affairs	in	the	






it	 is	necessary	 for	 Japanese	 firms	 to	enrich	 the	 financial	 information	 for	 corporate	
















	 Investors	 in	 Japanese	 firms	 are	 sensitive	 to	 the	manager’s	 response	 to	 the	
effectiveness	of	corporate	governance,	particularly	in	their	accountability.	The	increase	
of	M&As	by	 takeover	bid	“hostile	TOB,”	makes	most	managers	 to	 face	 a	 critical	
problem	on	management.	Mandatory	disclosure	 for	corporate	governance	has	rapidly	
developed.	The	First	Subcommittee	of	the	Financial	System	Council,	an	important	third-
party	advisory	council	 to	 the	Financial	Services	Agency	 (FSA)	stated	 in	 the	Report,	
December	16,	2002,	that	we	need	more	information	to	strengthen	corporate	governance.	
This	report	was	one	of	 the	reforms	to	 improve	security	market	 through	the	cases	of	
window	dressing	by	U.S.	firms	in	2003.	
	 Furthermore,	 based	 on	 the	 report,	 FSA	 announced＊3	Measures for Ensuring 
Confidence in the Disclosure System	 on	November	 16,	 2004;	 (1)	 Introduction	 of	
the	 following	 requirements	 regarding	 internal	 control	 over	 financial	 reporting:	 an	







2005	 in	order	to	 (a)	enhance	disclosure	related	to	corporate	governance	and	to	 (b)	put	
into	effect	disclosure	of	parent	company	 information	 in	subsidiary	companies’	financial	






years	of	Olympus.	Hatta	et	al	 (2011)	explains	 that	 it	has	historically	been	considered	
to	be	a	 serious	problem	 that	 Japanese	companies	have	 sometimes	 the	weakness	of	
governance	and	audit	and	various	disgraceful	affairs.	Actually,	overseas	investors	have	
thought	 that	 financial	 statements	of	 Japanese	 firms	without	 reliability	 since	several	






frauds	 since	 1990,	which	 resulted	 in	 the	problem	of	Legend Clause.	The	growing	
discussions	about	higher	corporate	governance	made	global	markets	to	develop	with	the	
transparency	of	their	accounting	information.	





they	were	paying	attention	 to	 recent	discussions	on	corporate	governance	 to	 some	
extent.	The	2003	survey	shows	that	75.3%	of	 the	companies	answered	the	extensive	
disclosure	and	accountability	for	investors	to	enhance	corporate	governance	(TSE	2003).
	 Now,	we	have	 to	 study	 for	good	experiences	 in	 the	past	 for	 Japanese	 firms	 to	





Ⅱ  Nature of Corporate Governance
What is the Corporate Governance?





OECD	 (2004,	p.	 4)	 explains	about	 the	 reason	of	 the	 revision,	 as	 the	principles are	a	
living	instrument	offering	non-binding	standards	and	good	practices	as	well	as	guidance	




＊6　	You	 can	 download	 the	 document	 by	 various	 languages	 such	 as	French,	 German,	









The relationship between corporate governance and Disclosure	
	 Because	the	measure	to	evaluate	the	corporate	value	 is	stock	price	 in	general,	 the	
effectiveness	of	corporate	governance	needs	positive	disclosure.	Disclosure	 is	classified	
into	 two	 types:	mandatory	systems	and	voluntary	systems.	The	 former	depends	on	
some	regulations	like	accounting	standards,	audit	standards,	and	corporate	law	etc,	while	





Ⅲ  Hostile TOB in Japan




in	 the	near	 future.	However,	 some	cases	 for	hostile	TOB	have	already	been	shown	
before	10	years.	Then,	why	are	 they	concerned	 in	 recent	years?	 	According	 to	 the	














systems	and	 (2)	overvalued	stock	price,	and	 (3)	unattractive	business	or	companies	 for	
investment.	First,	it	points	that	accounting	and	corporate	governance	systems	in	Japan	
have	been	more	transparent	than	those	 in	the	beginning	of	1990.	 Indeed,	after	several	


















	 The	ratio	of	 foreigners	 in	Mar.	2004	has	been	21.8%,	about	 two	 times	as	high	as	
in	Mar.	 1996.	 Iemori	 (1998)	verifies	 that	 the	correlation	between	 this	 ratio	 and	 the	
assessment	of	governance	system	is	positive,	that	is,	the	better	the	market	assessment	
of	governance	system	is,	 the	higher	the	shareownership	of	 foreigners	 is.	Anyway,	 the	
three	points	would	be	some	factors	to	increase	hostile	TOB	in	these	days.	
Defense Measures: Legal and Corporate Governance System
 			The	Defense	Measures	against	hostile	attacks	are	divided	into	two	factors	by	inside	
and	outside	points	where	the	responsibility	lies:	 (1)	Improvement	of	effective	corporate	














Ⅳ  Case Studies













Cases of Sotoh and Yushiro
 Sotoh	is	one	of	the	chemical	companies	for	staining	of	woolen	textile.	Those	activities	




TOB	price	showed	by	 the	 fund,	 they	has	declared	 to	 increase	 the	dividend	 for	 two	
years	running,	the	annual	year,	Mar.	2004	to	Mar.	2006,	concurrently	the	withdrawal	of	
MBO.	The	plan	(Table	2)	settled	the	dividend	per	share	into	200	yen	in	Mar.	2004	and	
promised	 the	 total	would	be	500	yen	 in	next	 two	years,	which	defended	against	 the	
hostile	TOB.	
	 Yushiro,	a	chemical	firm	that	in	the	field	of	metalworking	oils	and	fluids,	is	recognized	





Fiscal results, May 2004 − 200.00
Source:	Sotoh’s	information	in	Separate	Interium	Statements	of	the	fiscal	year	ending	March	31,	2005.
Note:	75.00	yen	per	share	including	68.50	yen	per	stock	as	special	dividends.
Table 3 Yushiro’s Amanded Dividends (Expected) after the TOB 
	
Original	Plan May-04 May-05 May-06 May-07
Net	Income	(Million	Yen) 700 800 900 1,000
Cash	Dividends	(Million	Yen) 2,960 740 ～ 770 840 ～ 870 940 ～ 970
Cash	Dividends	per	Share	(Yen) 200 50 ～ 55 55 ～ 60 60 ～ 65
Amanded	Plan May-04(results) May-05 May-06 May-07
Net	Income	(Million	Yen) 830 900 950 1,000
Cash	Dividends	(Million	Yen) 2,960 840 ～ 870 880 ～ 920 940 ～ 970
Cash	Dividends	per	Share	(Yen) 200 50 ～ 60 57 ～ 62 60 ～ 65

















Case of Nippon Broadcasting
	 Fuji Television Network, Inc. and Nippon Broadcasting System, Inc. today signed 
a basic agreement that will result in Nippon Broadcasting becoming a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Fuji Television. 
	 This	 is	 the	 first	 sentence	 in	 the	notification＊10	 announced	by	 the	Broadcasting	
Company	on	April	18,	2005.	Nippon	Broadcasting	 is	a	broadcasting	company,	mainly	
as	the	means	by	radio.	The	entrance	by	Internet	Portal	Livedoor	Co.,	LTD.	 (Livedoor)	


















Market	Value（Mar.	31） 10,673 44.3 Mar.	24 10,432 53.9 Mar.	31
Market	Value（the	day	of	TOB) 17,107 71.1 Dec.	24 15,512 80.2 Dec.	12








	 The	70-day-long	disturbance	ended	 in	the	agreement	of	 the	two	firms	that	the	TV	
Company	will	not	only	purchase	all	 the	shares	of	Nippon	Broadcasting	that	Livedoor	
took	during	 its	hostile	TOB	but	also	acquire	a	stake	 in	the	Web	portal	operator	 itself.	
They	are	also	going	to	talk	on	a	tie-up.	Ultimately,	Livedoor	could	get	about	150	billion	
yen	 from	100	billion	yen	of	 the	principal	 investment.	Morewhile,	Fuji	has	been	 faced	
on	the	 two	kinds	of	risk	 that	 invests	 in	 the	Net	and	gives	 the	negative	effect	 for	 its	
shareholders.	Fuji	TV	and	Nippon	Broadcasting	showed	the	following	considerations	to	
their	stockholder:	
(1)	The interests of minority shareholders of Nippon Broadcasting System 
(2)	The rapid execution of an exchange of stock between Fuji Television and Nippon 
＊ 11	Nihon	Keizai	Shimbun,	February	8,	2005.


















April	18 Nippon	Broadcasting	 and	Fuji	TV	 signed	 a	 basic	 agreement	 that	will	 result	 in	Nippon	
Broadcasting	becoming	a	wholly	owned	subsidiary	of	Fuji	Television.






Broadcasting System in order to capture synergies quickly across the businesses 
of the two companies. To prevent dilution of the value of shares held by current 
Fuji Television shareholders, Fuji Television will restrict the issuance of new 
shares.
Refer to Nippon Broadcasting’s News Release, “Notification of Basic Agreement 




Disclosure Development for Effective Corporate Governance
	 This	 paper	 studies	 the	 disclosure	 for	 effective	 corporate	 governance	 in	 the	
preliminary	release	of	financial	results	in	the	three	cases	of	Sotoh,	Yushiro	and	Nippon	
Broadcasting.	It	is	examined	how	they	changed	the	disclosure	information	for	corporate	
Table 6 Sotoh’s Disclosure Information in 2004 
	
(1)	Enhancement of Capital Efficiency
Management	Policy
	Targeting	managemet	measure:	Sotoh	Group	makes	effort	for	the	enhancement of capital efficiency,	profitability	
and	 corporate	 value,	 targeting	 5%	 exceed	 return	 on	 equity	 as	 a	
management	measure.
Operating	Result	and	Financial	Position
	Perspective	 for	 the	next	year:	 Sotoh	Group	 think	 that	 it	 is	 basically	 important	 for	 the	high	quality	 of	
management	 on	 condition	 that	 looks	 at	 such	 a	 difficult	 situation	 and	
discriminate	against	cheaper	imports.	We	will	improve	operations	activities	
positively,	developing	attractive	processing	techiniques	as	well	as	a	exert	
ourselves	 to	 cut	 total	 costs,	 improve	 the	 competitivness	 of	 business,	
and	 furthermore	reform	over	enhancement of capital efficiency	and	over	
management.
(2)	Methods of Dividend Yield
Management	Policy
	Basic	policy	of	dividend	yield:		We	consider	that	our	retained	earnings	are	at	the	level	that	can	be	fit	for	more	












	 In	 the	 Sotoh’s	 release	 after	 the	 announcement	 of	TOB,	more	 information	 for	
‘enhancement	of	 capital	 efficiency’	and	‘methods	of	dividend	yield’	has	newly	been	
added.	That	 shows	 the	executives	 transferred	holding	earnings	 into	paying	positive	
dividends	 as	 their	management	 policy.	 In	 the	mean	 time,	Yushiro	 fulfilled	more	






including	value:	The	enforcement	of	profit	distribution	policy	 to	 increase	 shareholder 
value	(100%	payout)	and	the	timely	disclosure	(positive	activities	for	investor	relations).	
	 How	about	Nippon	Broadcasting?		There	are	no	words	about	corporate	governance	





Table 7 Yushiro’s Value Information 
	
Value (Corporate, Shareholder, Stock)
Management	Policy




the	apropriate	 level	on	 the	 future	 investment	 for	medium	or	 long	 term	




	Management	plan	 for	medium	or	 long	 term:	The	 enforcement	 of	 profit	 distribution	policy	 to	 increase	





	 	The state of enforcement in this recent year for enhancement of our corporate 
governance
	 We make effort to study for the enhancement of our corporate governance. To 
make the strengthening of corporate governance and the improvement of corporate 
value be effective, our company appointed three outside directors as new members 
to the board in the annual meeting, June 2004. 
	 Refer to the Nippon Broadcasting’s interim preliminary release as of Nov. 24, 
2004.
	 However,	I	could	not	examine	the	change	of	the	information	concerned	about	corporate	









disclosed	on	 the	 release	 is	valuable	 for	 them.	However,	 the	definition	of	 corporate	
governance	 is	not	collective,	but	various,	 as	OECD	 (2004)	and	Yanaga	 (2004)	 stated,	
for	example,	 of	 several	previous	 researches,	 corporate	governance	 is	 regarded	as	a	
system	to	supervise	managers	for	stockholders	(Wakasugi	2001)	and	to	make	them	well	
disciplined	 to	secure	shareholder’s	 income	 (Osano	2001).	 It	 is	also	generally	called	 in	
Japan	as	“kigyo-touchi”	that	means	‘to	govern	a	company’.	





	 	 	 In	 this	study,	 it	 is	 shown	that	Sotoh’s	and	Yushiro	have	changed	 their	policies	 to	
disclose	 for	 corporate	governance	 after	TOB.	Actually,	 they	have	prepared	more	
information	 related	 to	 corporate	governance	as	well	 as	 announced	 to	 increase	 the	
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dividends	 for	 several	years.	Sotoh	added	 information	about	‘enhancement	of	capital	
efficiency’	and	‘methods	of	dividend	yield’	 to	show	their	management	policy	that	pay	
positive	dividends	 for	 current	 and	potential	 shareholders.	Yushiro	 discloses	more	
information	about	positive correspondence of investor relations	(IR)	and	values	concerned	
about	corporate	governance.	As	shown	by	the	values	in	9	parts,	the	policy	is	shown	to	
strengthen	operations	for	shareholders.	On	the	other	hand,	Nippon	Broadcasting	changed	
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